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Abstract
While it is widely acknowledged that psychology is in the throes of a replication
‘crisis’, relatively little attention has been paid to the role theory plays in our
evaluation of replications as ‘failed’ or ‘successful’. This paper applies well-known
arguments in philosophy of science about the interplay between theory and
experiment to a contemporary case study of infants’ understanding of false belief
(Onishi and Baillargeon [2005]), and attempts to replicate it. It argues that the
lack of consensus about over-arching theories informing both the concepts under
study and the methodologies used to track them means that researchers disagree
over which experiments constitute replications of the original. The second part of
the paper places this specific debate within a broader discussion of the replication
crisis as a crisis of ‘theory’, developing work by Muthukrishna and Henrich ([2018])
and Alexander Bird ([2018]). Bird argues that the lack of agreed over-arching
theories in psychology means that a high rate of replication failure is to be
expected; this paper agrees with his diagnosis but challenges his proposal that
more replication will resolve the problem.
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1 Introduction
The psychological sciences are currently in the throes of a replication ‘crisis’ (Lilienfeld
and Waldman [2017], McNutt [2014], Open Science Foundation [2015], Pashler &
Wagenmakers [2012]). In the broadest sense, replicating an experiment consists in
repeating the original experiment and gaining the same results. A failed replication is
one where the results do not match those of the original. Failed replications can cast
doubt on the veracity of the original findings, leading to allegations of bad practice such
as HARK-ing (hypothesising after the results are known), p-hacking, selective data
inclusion, and outright fabrication of the data (Cooper [2013]; Fanelli [2009]; Fang et al.
[2012]; Kerr [1998]; Miller [2010]; Peterson [2016]). If failing to successfully repeat the
results of another’s experiment exclusively points to bad methods on behalf of the
original experimenters, then the current run of failed replications certainly suggests a
crisis in the psychological sciences.
While malpractice can be a causal factor for experiments failing to replicate (Fanelli
[2009]), it certainly is not the only one. This has long been acknowledged by
philosophers of science, who point out that the process of deciding whether Experiment
B successfully replicates Experiment A is by no means straightforward (Collins [1985,
1989]; Feest [2016]). There are questions to be asked about how closely the methods of B
follow those of A, and decisions to be made about how similar the results of the two
experiments need to be in order for B to constitute a successful replication of A. Even if
one has settled these questions satisfactorily, there are the further complications of
assessing the theoretical consequences of B failing to replicate A. Were A’s results a false
positive or coincidence, or were B ’s? Which experiment gives the more accurate picture
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of the phenomenon in question? Some of these complications are captured in what Harry
Collins terms the ‘Experimenters’ Regress’ (Collins [1985]). Imagine that researchers are
working to discover whether an effect E exists. Research group R believe that E does
exist, and conduct experiment A, the results of which appears to support their
hypothesis that E exists. Research group R′ does not believe in the existence of E, and
conduct experiment B which is intended to repeat the methods of A. The results of B do
not support the hypothesis that E exists. Further replications are conducted, some of
which support the hypothesis that E exists, others contradicting it. The problem is that
there is no consensus about what the right result of the experiment should be, as no-one
yet knows for sure that E exists (or doesn’t exist). And if we do not know what the right
result should be, we cannot easily judge which experiments should be considered
successful in getting the correct outcomes. This puzzle remains even when all the
experiments are performed well (i.e. there is no malpractice in any of the research
groups), demonstrating that failed replications are not always indicative of bad scientific
practice (either on behalf of the original experimenters, or the replicating teams)
(Stroebe and Strack [2014]).
There are deep philosophical issues to be explored concerning how we characterise
replications and how they impact discussions about objectivity in science and the role of
experiments in the scientific method (Sprenger [2018]; Romero [forthcoming]), tactics for
breaking the experimenters’ regress, and non-scientific influences on hypotheses (Feest
[2016]). This paper develops one aspect of this debate, namely, how experimenters’ prior
theoretical commitments affect their evaluation of a replication as ‘failed’ or ‘successful’,
through the lens of a contemporary case study: the ongoing debate about infants’
understanding of false beliefs. Section two describes the case study in detail, with
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sections three and four highlighting points where researchers’ theoretical commitments
about the both methodology and the concepts it tracks, affect their evaluation of
replication work. The second part of the paper shows how the issues covered in sections
three and four are specific instantiations of more general explanations that have been
given for psychology’s replication crisis. Section six examines an argument given by
Michael Muthukrishna and Joe Henrich ([2019]) (among others) that new areas of science
lack over-arching theories to inform their hypotheses and guide intuitions, and shows
how this applies to the case study; and section seven applies these observations to a
recent contribution by Alexander Bird ([2018]), wherein he argues that we should expect
a high rate of false positives in the psychological sciences due to a low prior probability
that the hypotheses under consideration are true. While I believe Bird’s diagnosis is
correct, I disagree with his analysis of how replication can help improve the situation.
Although bad scientific practices, as well as sociological factors such as the
‘file-drawer’ effect and the incentives associated with publishing positive findings, are
partially responsible for the current replication crisis, these factors are by no means
exhaustive and will not be discussed further in the paper. Unfortunately, failing to
replicate a finding is often perceived as a black-mark against the original lab, threatening
to spiral to suspicion, animosity and even funding cuts. Furthermore, this solely negative
view of failed replications threatens public trust in science: how can we trust what one
research team says when another will show them to be wrong (Ferguson [2015])? I do
not believe that any of the results discussed in the paper stem from bad science. Thus, a
further aim of this paper is to serve as a call to arms for philosophers of science: there
are many philosophically interesting and illuminating reasons for why experiments do
not replicate which have nothing to do with bad scientific practice. There is so much for
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philosophers of science to do in developing and evaluating these reasons, which in turn
has the potential to better our understanding of the phenomena in question as well as
reinforcing that contradictory results are part of the scientific journey, and not just bad
data.
2 Infants’ Understanding of False Beliefs
This section gives a brief history of the false belief tasks, before explaining in detail one
particular infant false belief (IFB) task and attempts to replicate it.
2.1 Elicited response false-belief tasks
In 1983 Hans Wimmer and Josef Perner set out to see whether children could attribute
false-beliefs to other people. They devised the ‘Maxi’ task, the format of which has been
the foundation for hundreds of subsequent tasks. Children watch a puppet, Maxi, hide
some chocolate in one of two cupboards. Maxi leaves the chocolate in cupboard X and
goes out to play. In his absence, his mother enters and moves the chocolate from
cupboard X to cupboard Y. She leaves and Maxi returns, then the child is asked where
Maxi will look for his chocolate. Three-year olds overwhelmingly respond that Maxi will
look in cupboard Y, that is, where the chocolate really is and not where Maxi believes
the chocolate to be. Around four-years of age children correctly answer that he will look
in cupboard X. The authors explained their result with the hypothesis that three-year
old children are limited in their ability to attribute psychological states to other people
and are unable to attribute false beliefs to others, whereas four-year old children have
developed this ability. This task, and those like it, are referred to as ‘Elicited response’
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tasks as they require the child to respond to a question asked by the experimenter:
‘Where will Maxi look for his chocolate’.
In a meta-analysis of 178 elicited response false-belief tasks, Wellman et al ([2001])
report that ‘the “medium” in which the false-belief task is presented has no significant
effect. That is, it makes no difference if the protagonist is presented as a real person, a
puppet, a doll, a pictured storybook character, or a videotaped person’ (p.664). And
while there is some variation in the age at which children pass,1 overall the trend is
robust, and has even been referred to as ‘developmental dogma’ (Low et al. [2016]):
four-year olds succeed, whereas three-year olds fail.
2.2 Spontaneous response false-belief tasks
In 2005 Kristine Onishi and Rene´e Baillargeon published their paper ‘Do 15-month-old
infants understand false beliefs?’ wherein they argued that ‘Yes, they do’ . They gained
their results through a completely different paradigm to the Maxi task, using
measurements of infants’ spontaneous looking times rather than verbal, elicited
responses.
Onishi and Baillargeon’s experiment used the well-established ‘Violation of
Expectation’ (VoE) paradigm. This paradigm exploits the fact that infants look longer
1For example, children with siblings pass the test earlier than only children (Perner et al
[1994]); children from families with low SES (socioeconomic status) are slower to develop
mastery of false belief tasks (Holmes et al [1996]); children with low social status within
a group struggle with some false belief tasks (Rizzo & Killen [2018]); and the frequency of
mental state talk within the family affects false belief performance (Brown et al [1996]).
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at events that surprise them. Surprising events are those which the infant did not expect
to happen, and therefore a longer looking time at event B in contrast to event A
indicates that the infant expected A but not B to occur. The theory is that results build
up a picture of what infants expect from the world, which in turn gives insight into their
knowledge about how the world works. Originally used to test infants’ understanding of
physical knowledge (Baillargeon [2004]), the paradigm has been extended to test infants’
understanding of psychological concepts like goals, agency and, in this experiment, belief.
The VoE paradigm is referred to as a ‘spontaneous response’ method, as it measures an
involuntary response from the infant. This contrasts with ‘elicited response’ tasks which
require the child to give a voluntary response in the form of pointing or speaking.
The first stage of the experiment is to familiarise the infant to a series of events until
she loses interest. In the first familiarisation event the infant watched an experimenter
play with a watermelon toy, before placing it in one of two boxes in front of her (green or
yellow). In the second and third familiarisation trials the experimenter approached the
apparatus and reached into the box where she left the watermelon, as if to grab it.
The second stage of the experiment is the ‘belief induction’. Here the infants watch
one of four conditions. In the critical false belief conditions, the infant saw the
watermelon move, in the experimenter’s absence, from the box where it had been left
into the other box. In order to counteract the possibility that infants just had a
preference for boxes of a particular colour, there were two distinct false belief conditions.
In one the toy moved from the yellow box, where the experimenter had left it in the
familiarisation trials, to the green box. In the other, the experimenter was initially
present, and watched the toy move from the yellow box, where she had left it, to the
green box. The experimenter was then occluded by a screen, at which point the toy
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moved from the green box back into the yellow box. In the two true belief conditions the
experimenter was present throughout and watched the movement of the toy. The third
stage of the experiment is the test trial. Here, each infant was shown one of two events:
the experimenter reaching into a green box or the experimenter reaching into the yellow
box, and the looking time of the infant during this event was recorded.
The critical finding was that infants would look longer at those test trials where the
experimenter did not act in accordance with her belief about the watermelon’s location,
regardless of whether that belief was true or false. For example, in the condition where
the experimenter leaves her toy in the yellow box, and the toy moves in the
experimenter’s absence to the green box, during the test trial infants who saw the
experimenter reach into the green box (where the toy actually is) looked considerably
longer at this event than those infants who watched the experimenter reach into the
yellow box. This indicates that those infants who saw the experimenter act on her false
belief about the toy’s location were not at all surprised by this outcome, in contrast to
those infants who saw the experimenter act in a way that did not match with her belief.
This led Onishi and Baillargeon to conclude that
‘Whether the actor believed the toy to be hidden in the green or the yellow
box and whether this belief was in fact true or false, the infants expected the
actor to search on the basis of her belief about the toy’s location. These
results suggest that 15-month-old infants already possess (at least in a
rudimentary and implicit form) a representational theory of mind: They
realize that others act on the basis of their beliefs and that these beliefs are
representations that may or may not mirror reality.’ ([2005], p.257)
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Another frequently used spontaneous method is that of ‘Anticipatory Looking’
(Surian et al. [2007]; Southgate et al. [2007]; Luo and Baillargeon [2007]). In this
paradigm, researchers measure where an infant looks at a scene, before the protagonist
comes back to retrieve her object. If the infant looks to where the protagonist should
search for her object in the light of her beliefs, then this is taken to support the
hypothesis that the infant is correctly attributing beliefs to the protagonist. Since Onishi
and Baillargeon’s 2005 publication there have been more than thirty published papers
reporting success in spontaneous response false belief tasks in infants aged two years-old
and younger (see (Scott and Baillargeon [2017]) for a review). While VoE and
Anticipatory Looking are the most used paradigms, researchers have also claimed success
using other spontaneous methods (e.g. EEG measurements (Southgate and Vernetti
[2014]))2. This forms a significant body of work used to support the view that infants
can attribute false beliefs to other people.
2.3 The developmental gap
These two sets of data, from elicited and spontaneous false belief tasks, have given rise
to what is known as the ‘Developmental Gap’. Why is it that infants’ looking times
appear to support the hypothesis that they can attribute false beliefs to others, while
three-year olds’ performances on elicited task consistently fail to show any such ability?
Since the publication of Onishi and Baillargeon’s work in 2005 this question has
dominated developmental psychology and attracted a great deal of attention from
philosophers of cognitive science. But recent attempts to replicate the results of
2EEG: Electroencephalogram
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spontaneous response tasks, in particular VoE and Anticipatory Looking tasks, have met
with very mixed success, causing some to question the robustness of the data and, in
turn, the support they offer for the hypothesis that infants can attribute false beliefs to
others (Kulke et al. [2018]).
2.4 Replication
This paper will focus on replication attempts of Onishi and Baillargeon’s infant false
belief task for two reasons: first, in a recent meta-analysis of 33 spontaneous response
tasks, Pamela Barone and colleagues ([2019], p.13) reported that correct performance on
the VoE task was ‘about 3.58 times more likely than incorrect performance’, whereas no
significant effect size was found across Anticipatory Looking tasks; second, as an analysis
of both VoE and AL paradigms is beyond the scope of this paper, focusing on what the
scientific community takes to be the more reliable paradigm seems a reasonable starting
point (Barone et al. [2019]; Poulin-Dubois et al. [2018]).
Kulke and Rakoczy ([2018]) report nine replication attempts of Onishi and
Baillargeon’s VoE false-belief task. Each replication attempt deviated from the original
in small ways, e.g. using different stimuli or not including true-belief as well as
false-belief trials. However, the ‘primary information focus’ (Schmidt [2009], p. 94)
remained the same through the experiments: babies watch an actor hide an object in one
location; in the actor’s absence the object is moved to a different location; when the
actor returns she either looks in the location where she left her toy (belief-congruent
condition: behaviour matches belief), or she looks to where the toy is now
(belief-incongruent condition: behaviour does not match belief). The critical measure is
10
how long infants look at each condition.
Of the nine replication attempts, four are reported as successful, and three of these
were conducted by members of Baillargeon’s lab with Baillargeon as a co-author (a point
that will be discussed in section four). Kulke and Rakoczy do not report the results from
the non-replication studies (beyond saying that they did not replicate the original
findings). However, two published papers shed light on this. Lindsey Powell and
colleagues ([2018]) reported that there was no interaction between infants’ (17 months)
looking times and the trials, concluding that ‘we failed to find evidence that 1.5-year-old
infants expected the experimenter to reach for an object either where she falsely believed
it to be, or in its true location’ ([Powell et al., 2018, p. 5]). Sebastian Do¨rrenberg and
colleagues ([2018]) had a partial replication with 24 month old infants: while infants
looked significantly longer at belief-incongruent trials in contrast to belief-congruent
trials, they only did so in the false-belief condition. That is, there was no difference in
looking time between conditions where an actor behaved in a way that matched her
true-belief, versus those where she acted in a way that did not match her true-belief.
This is a problematic result as it suggests that infants can correctly recognise when
someone’s behaviour does not match her false-belief, but not when that behaviour does
not match her true belief! Do¨rrenberg suggests that this data supports a
non-psychological explanation of the results, indicating that infants simply look longer at
trials when someone reaches for a full, rather than an empty box ([Poulin-Dubois et al.,
2018, p. 309]). Finally, Yott and Poulin-Dubois ([2012]) found 18 month old infants
looked longer when an actor’s search behaviour did not accord with her beliefs. However,
as they did not run a true-belief condition these data can be considered only a partial
replication of Onishi and Baillargeon’s original findings, for reasons just rehearsed in
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Do¨rrenberg’s case.
3 Theory and the ‘Phenomena in Question’
Allan Franklin observed that a key factor in evaluating an experiment is
‘[...] the question of whether there is sufficient evidence showing that the
apparatus is actually measuring the quantity or phenomenon of interest, and
not some experimental artefact.’ ([Franklin, 1981, 370])
Harry Collins responded to Franklin by maintaining that his observation does not go
far enough, for in order to gain community consensus about the proper functioning of
the equipment and method ‘[t]here must be sufficient agreement over the nature of the
phenomenon in question to allow for there to be agreement over what is to count as a
well-performed experiment’ ([Collins, 1984, 173]). This section illustrates how different
researchers’ theoretical commitments affect the construal of the phenomena under
consideration, both of what is tracked by the VoE and how it is tracked.
3.1 Phenomenon one: belief attribution
Since Onishi and Baillargeon’s seminal paper researchers have argued about what kind of
conceptual competence is tracked by spontaneous methodologies. Three types of theory
dominate, and while all three accept that infants can have beliefs, they disagree about
what sorts of things infants can have beliefs about. The ‘Conceptually rich’ account
maintains that infants have the ‘capacity to attribute propositional representations of
various basic types, including belief’ to other people ([Carruthers, 2013, p.143]). In other
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words, infants can have beliefs about other people’s beliefs, i.e. the infant believes that
Sally believes that the ball is in the basket. Onishi and Baillargeon’s interpretation of
their data is a conceptually rich one (see section 2.2).
A second, psychologically-sparse group of views, maintains that infants can attribute
psychological states to others, but that the states they attribute are less complex than
‘propositional representations’ (Apperly [2010]; Butterfill and Apperly [2013]; Carey
[2009]; Low et al. [2016]; Wellman [2014]). These positions claim that infants track
relations that stand between an agent and an object, and that infants do not need to
represent the other’s psychological state in the form of a propositional attitude. Where a
conceptually rich account says ‘The baby believes that Sally believes that the ball is in
the basket’, psychologically-sparse account says ‘The baby believes ‘that Sally stands in
the ‘registering’ relation to that object’ (where ‘registration’ is a relational state).
Because psychologically-sparse accounts maintain that infants cannot attribute
propositional attitudes to others, they predict that infants should fail false-belief tasks
that require representing how an object appears to another person (Low et al. [2016]).
Finally there are the associationist, non-psychological accounts. These maintain that
infants are behaviourists and do not attribute anything psychological at all to the
protagonist (Heyes [2014a,b]; Santiesteban et al. [2014]). Instead, infants use
behavioural-rules to predict where the protagonist will look, e.g. the infant believes that
‘people return to where they last left an object’.
If the ‘phenomenon in question’ is ‘infants ability to attribute false beliefs to others’
then these hypotheses quite clearly disagree about whether Onishi and Baillargeon’s
experiment adequately measures it. It could, so the argument goes, equally well be
measuring an infants’ ability to track another’s registration, or her ability to apply rules
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about behaviours. Importantly, a failure to replicate Onishi and Baillargeon’s results
would affect all three hypotheses equally, as they each take for granted that the
experiment demonstrates an ability to discriminate between belief-congruent and
incongruent behaviours. Should this discrimination fail to replicate and subsequent
doubts are raised about its existence, then any theory whose aim is to explain it runs the
risk of redundancy.
3.2 Phenomenon two: expectation
In the VoE paradigm there are the methodological assumptions that if infants look
longer at event A, which is unexpected, in contrast to event B which is expected, then
this indicates that they...
‘...[1] Possess the expectation under investigation, [2] detect the violation in
the unexpected event, and [3] are ‘surprised’ by this violation.’ ([Baillargeon,
2004, 392])
These assumptions have not gone unchallenged. Bruce Hood and colleagues ([2004])
have argued against [1] on the grounds that one can detect that something has gone
awry without necessarily knowing what that is. For example, Kaiser and colleagues
([1985]) demonstrated that when college students were asked to draw the path of a
falling object (e.g. the trajectory of a ball emerging from a spiral tube) their drawing
was usually inaccurate. But when the same participants watched a movie simulation of
the event which mimicked the path they had drawn, they immediately recognised it as
somehow wrong. The participants detected that something was amiss with what they
had seen, but their drawings would suggest they did not possess an expectation of how
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the ball would fall.
In response, Baillargeon has argued that achieving [2] and [3] require that the
participant has an expectation ‘in some manner and at some level’ of what should occur,
therefore if there is agreement that these conditions have occurred then [1] stands by
necessity ([Baillargeon, 2004, 392]). Her response implies that this expectation is a
specific one, but one could offer a weaker reading of ‘expectation’, arguing that it is
fuzzy: sufficient to cause recognition of something as being wrong, without being specific
enough to pinpoint what, exactly, that may be. The bigger point here is that there is
disagreement about what an ‘expectation’ is, amounting to disagreement about the
‘phenomenon in question’ tracked by the method: is it a specific expectation or a fuzzy
one? If it is a fuzzy expectation, then we may expect more variance in the data, which in
turn affects the magnitude of the effect size, itself a key factor in how we evaluate
replication attempts as successful or unsuccessful.3
3.3 Phenomenon three: looking time
The VoE methodology requires a measurement of how long an infant looks at a particular
event. Typically, infants need to look at an event for at least two seconds to be included
in a data set. The methods for measuring infants’ looking times vary across laboratories.
3There is, in fact, huge variance in looking times across infants. A recent meta-analysis
by Barone and colleagues reported that ‘Looking times considerably varied from one ex-
perimental condition to another: they stretched from 4.52 to 29.5 s when unexpected
outcomes are presented and from 3.27 to 18.8 s in the case of expected events’ ([Barone
et al., 2019, 17]).
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In some cases, remote corneal-reflection eye trackers are used: cameras which track the
reflection from a participant’s pupils to determine what they are looking at. These
trackers give automatic measurements of the participant’s looking time, and some can
implement ‘participant controlled trials’, meaning that the trial ends automatically when
the baby looks away from the stimulus for more than two seconds. For the VoE false
belief studies discussed here, though, the more common method to measure eye-gaze is
through on- or off-line coding by human observers. Onishi and Baillargeon used on-line
coding, where two hidden observers watch the infant, and judge when she begins and
finishes looking at the event, with the trial ending when the primary observer determined
that the baby had looked away for more than two consecutive seconds, or had looked at
the scene for 30 cumulative seconds (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005, supplmentary
material). Powell and colleagues ([2018]) used ‘offline coding’, where two coders watch
video footage of the trial and measure how long the infant looks at each event. This
coding is ‘trial blind’, which means that coders do not know which condition the baby is
in; they simply record how long the baby looks at that event.4 It is standard practice to
report inter-observer reliability, and in published papers this is usually above 95%.
On- and off-line human coding are based on the same theoretical principle: human
observers are accurate enough in ascertaining when an infant starts and ceases to look at
a particular event. Here, at least, there is some consensus that the apparatus (human
coders) for measuring eye-gaze succeeds in tracking the phenomenon of interest (an
infant’s looking time). But it is noteworthy that experimental reports rarely, if ever,
justify why they use one method of measurement rather than another, and that Powell
4On-line coding is also assumed to be trial-blind; anecdotal evidence suggests that this
very difficult to implement in practice.
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and colleagues clearly felt that using a different measure of looking time did not mark a
significant difference between their ‘replication’ of Onishi and Baillargeon’s work and the
original. However, the possibility remains open that one laboratory may consider
another’s experiment to be less ‘well-performed’ should they choose a different method of
measuring looking time than the original experiment.
These three phenomena highlight points in any IFB experiment where the
researchers’ prior theoretical commitments shape how they measure the phenomenon of
interest, and what they take these phenomena to be. In the case of measurement there
appears to be some consensus that human observers can accurately measure looking
time; in the cases of the specificity of the expectation tracked by the VoE and the type of
psychological concepts required to succeed on the experimental task, the picture is more
complex. I return to these issues in section 6.
4 Experimenter Skill
Experimenter skill is a recurring theme in the replication literature (Collins [1985];
Leonelli [2018]; Polanyi [1967]). In a published paper, it is impossible to list all the
variables in any one experiment; the best one can do is list all the factors believed
necessary for bringing about the effect. However, as Collins documents in his case study
on TEA5 lasers ([1985]), when an experiment purports to show a new phenomenon, it is
almost never the case that an experimenter aiming to repeat the finding can reproduce
the original results based on the published report alone. Even when the two
experimenters meet to discuss their techniques, or the original experimenter visits the
5Transversely Excited Atmospheric pressure CO2 laser
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new lab to examine their set-up, it is not always clear what, in the knowledge exchange,
was the piece of information critical to getting the replication to work. When the
experiment is new, neither the original experimenter, nor the one aiming to replicate the
results, may know what is missing in the unsuccessful case; only that something is
missing.
Rene´e Baillargeon is one of the most skilled people in the world with the VoE
methodology, using it since the mid-1980’s in her work on infants’ understanding of the
physical world. She has undoubtedly embodied a huge amount of tacit knowledge
relevant to her trade (Polanyi [1967]), and not all of this knowledge will be presented in
a published paper.6 These skills, in turn, give her an unique perspective on what
constitutes a ‘well-performed’ replication of her work, a point that comes out clearly in
her responses to ‘failed’ replications. While she has offered several reasons for why her
original data failed to replicate, ranging from methodological changes to details of the
analysis of the infants’ looking times ([Buttelmann et al., 2018, pp. 113-5]), I focus here
on the two responses that most clearly illustrate her embodied experimental skill.
First, she observes that infants need to have an expectation of how the actor will
behave in order for that expectation to be violated. Her concern with Powell and
colleagues’ experiment is that the familiarisation trials are too complex, involving the
actor putting the toy in one box, leaving, and then returning and switching the toy to
another box. This occurs before the actor leaves for the second time and the
belief-induction trial commences (with the toy moving from where it has been left to the
6For example, in presentations she explains that she uses real actors whenever possible
because babies are far more interested in watching real people than videos, and so they
are more likely to attend to the stimuli.
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other location). Baillargeon writes
‘One factor that might have contributed to the task’s negative results is that
these events were somewhat confusing (e.g., why did the agent switch the toy
to the opposite box when she returned?) and made it difficult for children to
form a clear expectation about what the agent sought to accomplish.’
([Buttelmann et al., 2018, 113])
Her second concern is that Powell and colleagues did not allow the infant sufficient
time to form an expectation about the actor’s behaviour. In the original study, infants
watched the toy move from one box to another in the actor’s absence (belief-induction
phase), and this scene was then paused for a few seconds before they watched the test
phase. In Powell’s study, however, infants watched the familiarisation phase, followed
immediately by the belief-induction phase and then the test phase. Baillargeon
maintains that the ‘children did not have sufficient time to process the novel information
they had received and to form an expectation about what the agent would do before she
completed her actions.’ (ibid). That the pause is not explicitly mentioned in published
experimental reports suggests that its inclusion in the method stems from tacit
knowledge of how babies best respond in the lab: knowledge gained from many years of
experience. When the pause is missing (as occurs in the Powell failed replication), its
significance takes on a new importance. Here is a case where a lack of shared knowledge
in the community about how a particular methodology works affects replication success,
or, in Collins’ words, where ‘ignorance of the nature of the experimental conditions
makes it impossible to guarantee results’ ([1985], p.171). Replication experiments serve
an essential role in making tacit knowledge explicit, by encouraging a more rigorous
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investigation of the methods and how they work (Strack [2017]).
As noted above, of the nine replication attempts reported in Kulke and Rakoczy
([2018]), three of the four successful replication attempts of the VoE came from
Baillargeon’s laboratory. But maybe this outcome unsurprising, if this indeed is the
laboratory with the most knowledge and skill in applying the VoE method in the
false-belief case. One innovative way of overcoming these limitations is shown by the
‘Many Babies Consortium’ (Bergelson et al [forthcoming]), which conducts large scale
replication projects across infant laboratories. They ask each lab to upload a
‘video-walkthrough’ of the infant’s experience, from entering their laboratory through to
their departure. Each laboratory has its own way of welcoming and settling the infant,
which in turn are techniques the experimenters have learned through years of experience,
and a video is much more likely to show these than the most comprehensive of written
reports. However, it remains the case, as Collins points out ([1984], p.171) that the
strength of a replication often relies on who performed it, with research communities
giving more weight to successful replications from laboratories other than the original.
More rigorous forms of reporting how a method is applied, e.g. video-walkthroughs, have
the potential to share the knowledge embodied in a particular laboratory, de-mystifying
and thus increasing confidence in, the original experiment.
5 Fragile Effects
This section ties together themes from sections 3 and 4 — how our theories shape the
phenomena we are looking for, and the role of experimenter skill in eliciting responses
from infants — to show how they give rise to tension between the concepts the IFB task
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is intended to track, and the apparent fragility of those concepts.
Baillargeon’s knowledge about having a small pause between the familiarisation trial
and the test trial reveals a particular commitment that constrains and informs the design
of her work: infant cognitive effects are fragile, and therefore great care must be taken in
the experimental set-up to ensure that the conditions are optimal for those fragile effects
to manifest. Replications which omit one or another detail may fail to reveal the effect
under consideration. That infants’ ability to attribute false-beliefs to others is fragile is
not, to my knowledge, something that has been made explicit in discussions of the IFB
experiments. Acknowledging that this could be the case leads to two important
considerations: scoping the effect, and its ecological validity.
In her detailed examination of the ‘Mozart effect’, Uljana Feest shows how attempts
to replicate the effect resulted in scoping its limits beyond the initial broad claim that
‘listening to Mozart has positive effects on brain development’ ([Feest, 2016, 38]). A
similar interpretation can be offered of the IFB replications. It may be that instead of
the broad claim that ‘infants can attribute false beliefs to others’ a more careful one is
warranted, namely, that when the conditions are just-so, (with the specifications to be
fleshed out through further replication work), babies look longer at belief-incongruent
than belief-congruent behaviour. But when is an effect so fragile as to be non-existent?
The answer will be that the effect is fragile if the theory can specify the conditions under
which it will manifest (and why), and absent if no such scoping is forthcoming or
supported by the theory. A different replication debate illustrates this well: in the
literature on whether adults automatically process another’s perspective, where
replication attempts have been as messy as those discussed in this paper, Cathleen
O’Grady and colleagues ([forthcoming]) used failed replications to develop a theory of
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why this ability might not manifest robustly, and the conditions under which we might
expect to see it.
Several authors (Feest [2016]; Leonelli [2018]; Strack [2017]) have argued that failed
replications can play a crucial epistemic role in allowing researchers to scope the limits of
the effects under study, and to better understand the conditions under which they
manifest. This, in its turn, raises theoretical questions about the nature of the
phenomenon in question: if the conditions under which infants can attribute false beliefs
to others become very narrow, then how similar is the infant’s concept to the
pre-experimental theoretical concept belief? Beliefs are representational states that can
take any content. As such, they are indefinitely flexible, and while their flexibility will
depend on the conceptual capacities of the individual,7 it would be odd to say that an
infant who could only understand false-beliefs about an object’s location when the object
is a toy watermelon slice and the hiding places are one green and one yellow box, has the
belief concept. Advocates of the hypothesis that infants can distinguish
belief-congruent from belief-incongruent behaviour thus need to tread the fine line
between using failed replications of their work to offer a clearer account of the conditions
under which the VoE method can successfully track belief understanding, while also
retaining an account of the concept of belief8 that fits with their broader theoretical
commitments about cognitive architecture.
A further issue is what theories predict in terms of the ecological validity of the
experimental data. If one maintains that attributing psychological states to others is
7For example, one couldn’t expect an infant to have beliefs about global warming
8The same applies to hypotheses positing the concepts registration or behavioural
pattern
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fundamental to social understanding, then a limited hypothesis which suggests infants
only manifest this ability in carefully controlled laboratory situations is problematic.
Should relatively small tweaks to a careful experimental set-up mean that infants are no
longer sensitive to another’s false beliefs, then there is a question about whether, in the
messy real world, attributing beliefs to others is their primary way of understanding
their behaviours (Klein et al. [2014]). On the other hand, if one maintains that
attributing psychological states to others is not the primary way in which we interact
(Bermu´dez [2003, 2007]; De Jaegher et al. [2010]; Hutto [2017]; Ratcliffe [2006]), then
evidence to suggest that this ability only occurs in very specialised laboratory conditions
is taken to support the view that in more ecological contexts, social interactions do not
depend on this ability.
6 Theory and the Replication Crisis
The previous sections showed how different researchers’ understanding of the false
belief concept and their practice in using the VoE methodology affects their evaluation
of replications of the IFB experiment. This section explores how this corner of
developmental psychology intersects with broader theoretical analyses of psychology’s
‘replication crisis’, examining two explanations for the high rate of failed replications in
the field: first, that the discipline lacks over-arching frameworks to guide theoretical
intuitions; and second, that as a new discipline, there will be a higher number of false
hypotheses under consideration.
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6.1 A lack of ‘over-arching’ theories
In a recent paper, Michael Muthukrishna and Joe Henrich claimed that
‘Many subfields within psychology (though not all!) lack any overarching,
integrative general theoretical framework that would allow researchers to
derive specific predictions from more general premises. Without a general
theoretical framework, results are neither expected nor unexpected based on
how they fit into the general theory and have no implications for what we
expect in other domains.’ ([Muthukrishna and Henrich, 2019, 221]).
Although not explicitly acknowledged by the authors, this observation has its roots
deep in the philosophy of science and the Duhem-Quine thesis that hypotheses are
always tested against a backdrop of theoretical commitments. When a prediction does
not turn out as hypothesised, there are a number of places where it might have gone
wrong. The more established the science, the less likely it is that the foundational theory
is incorrect and the more likely it is that some aspect of the experiment is at fault. If
you drop a packet of mints into a bottle of diet cola and no fountain of pop ensues, this
is most likely to be because the cola is flat, or that the surface of the mints was too
smooth to cause the reaction. As there are thousands of replications of the cola-mint
fountain experiment conducted in gardens through the world (and documented online),
it is less likely that your experiment has revealed a gap in the current principles of
thermodynamics, surface science or eruption theory (Coffey [2008]). These ‘overarching,
integrative general theoretical frameworks’ are well-established and give us good reason
to expect particular experimental results; when the result is not forthcoming, the first
place to look is at the methods and materials of the experiment itself rather than the
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theoretical framework informing it.
As a relatively new science, many aspects of psychology lack the well-established
frameworks that guide researchers’ intuitions about what to expect. In no place is this
more salient than the case of infancy research, where systematic studies with infants and
toddlers have been conducted for around forty or so years, while many of the methods
and equipment used to explore infants’ understanding are even younger, originating in
the mid- to late 1990’s. This paper has shown that there is little in the way of consensus
about how the VoE method should be carried out, what kinds of concept it can track,
and how robust these concepts might be. Each of these disagreements reflects a lack of
well-established framework informing the experiments and the concepts they are
designed to track. Consequently, when a claim like ‘15-month old infants attribute false
beliefs to others’ is published, the research community does not have a strong sense of
whether this is likely to be a false-positive or a real phenomenon, as it neither supports
nor contradicts a foundational theory within the field. It is equally difficult to evaluate
failed replications of the work, as it will not be clear whether something has gone wrong
in the experimental set-up (because there is so little agreement about what the correct
experimental set-up should be), or whether the replication’s null result is the correct one,
again because a failed replication neither supports nor contradicts a well-established
existing theory.
6.2 Theoretical frameworks and the Base-Rate fallacy
Alexander Bird has argued that psychology’s replication crisis can be partially explained
by ‘the fallacy of neglecting the base-rate’ when it comes to generating successful
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hypotheses (Bird [2018]):
‘If there is both (i) a low background rate of truth among hypotheses
proposed and tested and (ii) a significance level set at a value that although
small is not negligible, then we would expect a high proportion of positive
results of tests of those hypotheses to be erroneous. Hence we would expect
many replication studies to fail to reveal what the original studies seemed to
show.’ ([2018], pp. 11-2)
I will set aside the point about significance, although at p = 0.05 developmental
psychology experiments generally do have a significance value that ‘although small is not
negligible’. Instead, the focus is on how having relatively few over-arching background
theories affects the base-rate fallacy.
Is developmental psychology a field where there is a low background rate of truth
among the hypotheses proposed and tested? The ideas developed above suggest that it
is. If there are few well-accepted over-arching theories to inform the hypotheses being
tested then (a) the theories which are informing the hypotheses might not be correct;
and (b) even if correct, they may not yet be sufficiently worked out to yield hypotheses
with a high degree of specificity (e.g how much longer infants should look at incongruent
events, section 3.2). In Bayesian terms, when there is uncertainty about the general
theories informing specific hypotheses, we are not in a position to give those hypotheses
a high prior probability. Furthermore, it may not be clear which hypothesis should be
awarded a higher prior than another, due to the lack of consensus about the background
theory informing each of them. The relative newness of psychology as a discipline means
that researchers may ‘lack the intuition’ ([Muthukrishna and Henrich, 2019, p.221]) that
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tells them when a hypothesis is likely to be false, e.g. it is not clear whether or not
babies ought to be capable of attributing false-beliefs to other people.
In practice, developmental psychologists do not seem to lack such intuitions,
conducting experiments only when they are confident of the result.9 Babies are hard
work: they require specialised laboratory facilities and equipment; experiments are time
consuming with each participant requiring a settling-in play session before the
experiment begins and a post-experiment debrief for caregivers, plus inevitable delays
due to naps, distractions, nappy changes and snacks; as well as routine expenses of
compensating caregivers for their time and travel, and a customary souvenir toy for the
baby. One thus needs a reasonably high level of confidence in one’s hypothesis before
taking on these costs. The bigger question is whether this confidence is justified.
Experimenters are confident in their hypotheses because they are confident about the
background theories informing them, e.g. if one is committed to the claim that babies
are capable of using complex, abstract concepts, then one is likely to be highly confident
that they are capable of attributing false beliefs to others. Bird’s claim is a descriptive,
not a normative one: while the experimenters concerned may have high confidence in
their hypotheses, the nature of the field is such that this confidence may be ill-founded.
The remedy, in line with Muthukrishna and Henrich’s work, is to step back and comb
through these theories, making explicit the reasons for (a) why we should expect babies
to be capable of using abstract concepts, and (b) more specifically, why we should expect
them to be capable of tracking false beliefs. Exploring these claims requires making clear
commitments about the cognitive architecture required for achieving these goals, and
9While I have no hard evidence for this claim, many conversations with developmental
psychologists suggest that it is the case.
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analysis of the onto- and phylogenetic developments such a cognitive architecture
demands. An exemplar of this approach is Susan Carey ([2009]), whose theory sets out
constraints on infants’ cognitive capacities that are informed by research in both
developmental psychology and cognitive ethology. Working within these constraints, her
account predicts that infants cannot attribute false-beliefs to others, and offer an
explanation of the data in term of tracking the agent’s goals ([Carey, 2009, 209])
(making her position one of the ‘psychologically sparse’ type, see section 3.1).
A counter to this argument is that we need to know what babies can achieve in order
to ensure our theories can accommodate these data. This tactic is in clear evidence in
many philosophical papers discussing mindreading and social cognition (Carruthers
[2011, 2013]; Lavelle [2019]; Michael and Christensen [2016]), where a list of experimental
data is held as the touchstone against which to evaluate various theories. But the
arguments presented in this section and throughout the paper suggest that we are simply
not in a position to know which infant data are robust (in contrast to the ‘developmental
dogma’ that is passing the Maxi task), precisely because there is, as yet, so much
vagueness in the theories the data are intended to support (or refute). John Ioannidis
argued that ‘The greater the flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes and analytic
model in a scientific field, the less likely the research findings are to be true’ ([2005],
p.44). . Section three showed just some of the controversies over design and definitions
that feature in the infant cognition literature, suggesting that a piecemeal analysis of
each of the moving parts (e.g. what can be tracked using the VoE methodology? how
much variation across participants do we expect and why?) is the best chance of getting
the background theories into better shape, so as to allow them to make more specific
predictions to be tested.
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While this paper agrees with Bird and others (Fanelli [2009]; Ioannidis [2005]) who
maintain that the base-rate fallacy accounts for why so many studies in psychology fail to
replicate, it is wary of the diagnosis that more replication will always solve the problem:
‘in due course, certain results will stand out as reliable (thanks to successful replication)’
(Bird [2018], p.25; see also Moonsinghe et al [2007]) . The fallacy of the base-rate applies
to the number of hypotheses researchers have to choose from; replication can only tell us
if particular data points are robust and not whether these data points support one or
another hypothesis. The result of the Maxi test is a developmental dogma, but there
remains controversy about how to interpret it. While this reliable result serves to narrow
the field of hypotheses by some degree (e.g. by ruling out all those that predict four-year
olds should fail the test), it still ‘rules in’ a huge number. The problem becomes more
pressing when applied to infant cognition, where there remains controversy about what
even constitutes a replication of an experiment (section four). Imagine that agreement
was reached about an experimental procedure replicating the original, and multiple
repetitions of the experiment yielded data matching the original data. What we would
end up with is that ‘infants under these very specific conditions (e.g. with live actors and
the pauses in the correct places between conditions) look longer when an actor acts in a
way that does not match with her beliefs’. This has become a robust finding, but there
are any number of reasons for why the data come out in this way.
Repeating a specific finding does not in and of itself reduce the space of false
hypotheses; what is required is a worked through theory of why the specific finding
comes out as it does, and which predicts other findings of equal specificity (Franklin and
Howson [1984]). This is not to say that there is no value in repeating experiments:
repeating experiments allows us to understand where variation might lie and how robust
29
or fragile we expect the result to be, both of which point to where the theory needs to be
more specific and supported. And getting a stable data point, albeit a very specific one,
is better than no data point at all. The moral is simply that successful replications alone
cannot resolve the theory-crisis that underlies the current replication crisis. It is only
once the theories are sufficiently worked through to make predictions about which effects
should be robust, under which circumstances and why, that progress can be made on this
front.
7 Conclusion
It is well-known through philosophy of science that theory infuses every aspect of
experiment, from how instruments are calibrated to commitments about the phenomena
those apparatus purport to track. Yet, with a few exceptions (Collins [1989]; Fiedler
[2017]; Strack [2017]), this point has been under-appreciated in the recent debates about
the replication ‘crisis’. This paper has aimed to show some of the points at which theory
intersects with experiment in the literature on infants’ understanding of false belief, and
in so doing revealed the complexity that afflicts our evaluations of replications as ‘failed’
or ‘successful’. The current run of experiments serve a critical epistemic role in scoping
the conditions under which infants look longer at belief-incongruent versus congruent
events, which in turn yields a more nuanced understanding of the effect to inform the
theories guiding the experimental work. However, we do not yet know (a) whether VoE
experiments reveal that infants can attribute false beliefs to others, or (b) whether VoE
studies of IFB replicate. Until some community consensus is reached on what a belief is,
how robust or fragile that concept is, whether the VoE can track it, and how specific the
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infant’s ‘expectations’ are, these questions remain open.
There are many more facets of the replication debate to be explored, beyond the
interaction of theory (or lack thereof) and experiment. For instance, this paper has not
touched on how to determine whether an experiment is sufficiently similar to the original
to count as a replication, or how many changes to the experiment can be made before it
no longer counts as a replication. These questions fall under the debates concerning
‘direct’ and ‘conceptual’ replication. There is a positive agenda to be drawn from the
current replication debates that isn’t captured by the term ‘crisis’ that has become
synonymous with them: it is time to rethink the replication ‘opportunity’.
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